The purpose of this paper is to examine the degree of concentration and efficiency in the Vietnamese banking system using the structural model. We apply the concentration ratio 
Introduction
Vietnam has become one of Asia's economic success stories in recent years, averaging growth of 7.8% a year. During previous years, the banking system provided capital for the economy, contributing approximately 16% to 18% of GDP annually which was almost equivalent to 50% of the total capital invested in the whole country since the transition in 1986. Hence, the banking system had developed strongly and played a crucial role as the connection between production, consumption, and savings. However, Vietnamese finance has had its problems, for example, during the 1997 Asian and 2008 Global crises. The domestic banking system still suffers from a lack of capital, inadequate provisions for possible loan losses, low profitability, inexperience of the capital markets, low pace of institutional reform (Dinh TTH and Kleimeier, 2007) and high dependence on governmental policies compared to foreign banks.
The objective of this study is to provide for the first time a comprehensive application of the extended structural models to the Vietnamese banking system. Using structural models we will examine how profitability is affected by market concentration (Structure-ConductPerformance) or market share (Efficiency Hypothesis). The structural model consists of the Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) and Efficiency Hypothesis (EH) approaches (Weiss, 1974; Smirlock, 1985; Lloyd-Williams et al., 1994 and Forbes, 1995) . The SCP approach examines whether a highly concentrated market causes collusive behaviour among large banks and whether it improves market performance. In contrast, the EH approach assesses whether efficient behaviour of large banks leads to an improvement in market performance. This paper's principal contributions are empirical. We employ the concentration-profitability model (SCP and EH approaches) to examine 48 Vietnamese commercial banks over the full sample (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) ) and four sub-samples (1999-2003; 2004-2009 ; five State Owned Commercial Banks (SOCBs) and 43 Non-State Owned Commercial Banks (non-SOCBs)). No previous study of the Vietnamese banking system has used the SCP or EH approach or utilised concentration ratios or HHIs. This is the main contribution of our paper. Further, we use 3 measures of market share and the concentration ratio based upon customer deposits, total assets and customer loans. For the concentration ratio we also consider 3-bank and 5-bank ratios. Such a variety of measures have not been employed by previous studies banking system studies -see, for example, Barth et al., (2001 Barth et al., ( , 2004 . In our models revenue over total assets, interest income over total assets and profit before tax over total assets are our dependent variables. Other environmental factors such as capital/assets, loans/deposits and number of branches are included in the model to account for risks, cost and size.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. The next section details developments in the Vietnamese banking system in the period from 1986 to 2009 while section 3 contains a brief review of the previous empirical literature of the structural model in banking. Section 4 deals with methodology and data, empirical results are presented in section 5 and section 6 gives conclusions.
The Vietnamese banking system during 1986-2009
From 1986 to 2009 the Vietnamese banking system was transformed from a mono to twotier banking system. The two-tier banking system has the State Bank of Vietnam (SBV) as the central bank (tier 1) and four specialised state owned banks (tier 2), see Figure 1 . The Vietnamese banking system was not affected by the 1997 crisis as drastically as other countries. The door for free international capital mobility was narrow. Foreign exchange transactions were maintained under control. In the 2008 Global crisis, there were still economic difficulties due to excessively rapid growth (average 7.8% a year from 2001 to 2007). These induced the government to concentrate on the regulatory environment. The banking system encountered many difficulties, resulting from loss of balance in the source and use of funds, and the rapid increase in credit growth. On this basis many banks were affected by tightening monetary policy. Compulsory measures were necessary for banks to reorganise and strengthen their organisations. Table 1 There are changes regarding non-SOCBs and SOCBs in terms of customer loans, total assets and customer deposits over the period. Non-SOCBs start to expand their total assets and offer customers both low-rate loans and high-rate deposits. On the other hand, SOCBs start to transform into non-SOCBs. The increase in the number of banks and decreased market concentration may suggest that banking service choice is increasing. Indeed, the growth in branch networks in many banks appears to reflect this trend. In addition, the growth of nontraditional banking services (such as through the stock exchange), derivative products, internet banking, phone banking, credit cards, ATM and so on also indicate that overall choice grew during this period.
Measuring performance using the structural model
The structural model consists of the Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) and Efficiency Hypothesis (EH) approaches. The SCP approach uses a model that can examine whether a highly concentrated market causes collusive behaviour among large banks and whether it improves market performance. In contrast, the EH approach is used to determine whether the efficient behaviour of large banks leads to an improvement in market performance. The difference between the SCP and EH approaches is not in the relationship between market structure, conduct and performance, but rather the connection between concentration and profit under public intervention to reach a competitive goal. The main idea of the EH is that an industry will become more concentrated under competitive conditions if some firms expand output. Such expansion will increase the degree of concentration at the same time that it increases the rate of return. The result may be better products that satisfy demand at a lower cost. In this case efficient firms tend to achieve a larger market share, leading to increased concentration of the industry. The success of firms will be reflected in higher returns and stock prices, not higher input prices (Demsetz, 1973 and 1974) 3 . After Demsetz a number of researchers embraced the EH, for example, McGee (1974 ), Smirklock (1985 , Jovanovic (1982) , Carter (1978) , Brozen (1970) and Phillips (1976) amongst others. Some economists were undecided regarding the two approaches, including Schamalensee (1985) and Eckard (1995) . In essence the EH is a criticism of the SCP approach on concentration, if it is still based on the SCP paradigm of explaining structure.
The non-structural method, defines bank structures as perfect competition, monopolistic competition or monopoly. Banking researchers might access three characters of market structure: concentration, product differentiation and entry barriers. It is widely accepted that the measurement of bank performance and the measurement of market structure are different but parallel to each other.
In bank performance, profitability (measured as return on assets and return on capital) is the preferred performance measure being used 38 times out of 133 cases that are considered (Molyneuxet al., 1996) . Profitability measures succeed in finding a significant relationship between market structure and industry performance. For market structure, concentration is commonly used (95 times) due to its easy quantification. Typical profitability-concentration studies include Weiss (1974) , Smirlock (1985) , Rhoades (1985) , Berger and Hannan (1989) , Molyneux and Thornton (1992) , Lloyd-Williams et al. (1994) and Molyneux and Forbes (1995) . 3 Demsetz is among those from the Chicago School (Stigler, 1968; Posner, 1979; Reder, 1982) that queried a challenge to Professor Joe Bain that used another explanation about structure, called the Efficiency Hypothesis (EH).
Most of the studies in the USA found evidence of a positive relationship between market share and profitability whereas studies in Europe generally suggest a positive relationship between concentration and profitability. Smirlock (1985) employed data of 2,700 US banks in seven states from 1973 to 1978. The model includes a set of control variables which reflect the differences in the size and growth of the banking sector, changes in capital resources, bank scale and the alliance with the holding corporation. Smirlock (1985) favoured the efficiency hypothesis. Evanoff and Fortier (1988) used data of more than 6,300 US banks in 30 states in 1984. They examined the effect of regulation on bank performance by dividing the market into those with high entry barriers and those with low entry barriers. In markets with high entry barriers market share has a strong impact on profitability. However, in markets with low entry barriers market growth has a significant and negative effect on bank profitability. In general, their results support the efficiency hypothesis. Berger and Hannan (1989) analysed data of 470 banks in 195 local US banking markets. They analysed the relationship between market concentration and profitability using non-competitive pricing behaviour. The empirical evidence indicates a negative link between market concentration and deposit interest. In other words, banks in a highly concentrated market exercise market power by paying low deposit interest. Molyneux and Thorton (1992) investigated the determinants of bank performance across 18
European countries between 1986 and 1989. They used a variety of profitability measures including before and after tax returns on total assets and the return on total equity. Generally, they found that market concentration has a positive impact on profitability. LloydWilliams et al. (1994) found that market share was either negatively related to profit or insignificant when included with a three-bank concentration ratio variable (which was positively related to profit) in their study of Spanish banks in 1980s. The results generally favoured the SCP hypothesis. Molyneux and Forbes (1995) used data for banks from 18
European countries from 1986 to 1989. Their findings also supported the traditional SCP approach. Their results suggest that concentration in the European banking market lowers the cost of collusion between firms and results in higher profits for all market participants.
Only a few researchers have analysed Vietnam's banking performance using concentration ratio (bank sizes) from reports of the SBV. Disappointingly, most of the indices on customer deposits, total assets and customer loans are limited for Vietnam. The problem of data collection made it difficult for researchers to investigate the issue through parametric models or non-parametric methods. No previous study has explicitly considered Vietnam's banking performance using the structural model (SCP or EH approaches). Barth et al. (2001) is a valuable report about regulation and supervision of banks around the world. Building on this work and other sources, Kousted et al. (2005) examined the market structure of Vietnam using concentration ratios. He argued that the Vietnamese banking sector is less concentrated than that of average developing countries. The degree of government ownership in the Vietnamese banking sector is very high compared to both other countries in the region and to the average level in developing countries. Barth et al. (2004) used deposits of five banks in concentration ratio. He indicated that a higher degree of state ownership tends to be associated with lower bank efficiency, less saving and borrowing, lower productivity and slower growth. The share of deposits of the five largest banks held by government-owned banks was 80% before 2001 (when they accounted for only 10% of the total of banks at that time). Barth et al. (2004) also found that tighter entry restrictions tend to increase overhead costs; the likelihood of a major banking crisis is positively associated with greater limitations on foreign bank participation.
In general, bank structure in Vietnam has not been analysed for a large number of banks and long period of time using parametric or non-parametric methods. Hence we extend the current research of Vietnamese bank structure in several ways. Firstly, we use three factors, customer deposits, total assets and customer loans, in either 3-bank or 5-bank ratios that reflect features of the Vietnamese banking system but have not been employed by previous studies. Secondly, we model and estimate revenue over total assets, interest income and profit before tax over total assets as the dependent variables. We will try to show, using the structural models, how the profitability measure is affected by market concentration (Structure-Conduct-Performance) or market share (Efficiency Hypothesis). Moreover, this is the first time that an extensive panel data set has been employed to examine the Vietnamese banking system. Our data set includes48 Vietnamese commercial banks over the period 1999 to 2009.
Methodology and data
Concentration-profitability in the SCP model will be employed to consider the banking structure of Vietnam. The motivation of this section is to answer the question of whether the Vietnamese banking market is collusive or efficient. An important contribution we make to the structural method is that we use 6 measures of CR based on the three factors, customer loans, total assets and customer deposits in both 3-bank and 5-bank ratios. No previous study of the Vietnamese banking system, such as Barth et al. (2001 Barth et al. ( , 2004 , has used all 6 measures. Barth et al. (2001 Barth et al. ( , 2004 and Kousted et al. (2005) Smirlock (1985) , Lloyd-Williams et al. (1994) and Molyneux and Forbes (1995) we will test the performance of the Vietnamese banking system by estimating the profit equation below:
where it π is a measure of bank i's profit in period t, it MS is a measure of market share, t CR denotes market concentration and it j Z , is a vector of j control variables which are included to account for firm-specific and market-specific characteristics. From (1), if:
• 0 1 > a and 0 2 = a : banks with a relatively high market share are more efficient than their rivals and earn rents because of this efficiency while increased market concentration does not result in banks earning any monopoly rents. This supports the efficiency hypothesis.
• 0 1 = a and 0 2 > a :market share does not affect bank rents and rents reflected in higher profitability are monopoly rents that result from increased market concentration. This supports the traditional SCP hypothesis (Smirlock, 1985) .
For testing purposes, we cast model (1) in empirical form, as follows: ROA is the natural logarithm of the return on assets (used to measure a bank's performance). We consider three measures of performance ) ( MS , is measured as the percentage of industry sales of a particular company or product and captures bank efficiency (Smirlock, 1985; Molyneux and Forbes, 1995) . We use the following 3 measures of market share: the total loans of bank i divided by total banking sector loans in year t (MS-CL), the total assets of bank i divided by total banking sector assets in year t (MS-TA) and the total deposits of bank i divided by total banking sector deposits in year t (MS-CD). The concentration ratio ( ) ,see Lloyd-Williams et al.(1994) and Molyneux and Forbes (1995) .
is the natural logarithm of a bank's asset size which is included as a control variable to account for cost and capital ratio differences related to bank size and to control for the possibility that large banks are likely to have greater product and loan diversifications than smaller banks. This increased diversification implies less risk and hence a lower required rate of return (Smirlock, 1985) . Table 3 to Table 5 report the estimated revenue and profit equations using the various concentration ratio (CR) and market share (MS) measures for the full sample. Table 3 reports the results for the CR and MS measures based on customer loans while Table 4 and Table 5 give the results using measures based on total assets and customer deposits, respectively. All models are estimated using the cross-sectional fixed-effects estimator 
Empirical results

Conclusion
This study has examined the SCP and EH models in order to analyse the Vietnamese banking system. The SCP hypothesis is the approach through which the influence of market structure on firms' performance is examined (Goddard et al., 2001) . If the banking industry is almost monopolistic the degree of competition is low and banks can indulge in collusive behaviour.
Consequently, a reinforcement of regulation on the part of the government would be recommended in order to prevent the abuse of market power by a small number of firms. In contrast, the method developed by members of the Chicago school, such as Demsetz (1973) , is the EH. According to this approach a positive relationship between concentration and profitability does not necessarily reflect collusive behaviour by several firms rather it shows that large firms come to earn high profits by performing efficiently. According to this concept the profitability measure is affected not by market concentration but by market share, because efficient firms can increase their market share and earn high profits even in a competitive and low-concentration market. This idea implies that the governmental regulation and intervention are inappropriate policies since they might impose penalties on efficient firms and discourage the proper functioning of the market mechanism. We also note that there were no substantial studies that applied the SCP and EH structural models to the Vietnamese banking system. The problem of data collection has made it difficult for researchers to investigate the issue through parametric models or non-parametric methods.
In terms of the empirical contribution to the international research, our study is the first time that the concentration ratio (CR), Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) and concentrationprofitability models (SCP and EH) have been employed to explain the performance of the Vietnamese banking system. We do this by considering a sample of the whole banking system and the following sub-samples: SOCBs and non-SOCBs from 1999 to 2009. Further, we apply all three measures of market share and concentration ratio based upon customer deposits, total assets and customer loans and that use both 3-bank and 5-bank concentration ratios. Previous studies for other countries used just one single concentration ratio variable such as 3-bank (Lloyd-Williams et al., 1994) or 10-bank (Molyneux and Forbes, 1995) measures. Secondly, we model and estimate revenue over total assets, interest income and profit before tax over total assets as the dependent variables. All the previous studies employed only profit before tax over total assets as the dependent variable of the model.
Our empirical results show that the Vietnamese banking industry was substantially less concentrated over the period 1999-2009 as both the CR and HHI fell. This suggests that the banking industry became more competitive. Small and medium banks have performed better in the 2000s but they might not compete against large banks. The increase in the number of banks and decreased market concentration may suggest that banking service choice is increasing. The estimated structural models do not, in general, support either traditional SCP or efficiency hypotheses. It could be that the business strategies of large Vietnamese banks during this period were focussed on raising capital, loans, assets, deposits, branch networks and reducing non-performing loans. Thus, revenue, interest income and profit before tax were not the most propriety missions of banks.
We believe that the SBV needs to strengthen the regulations on the current sources of revenue (securities, credit cards, derivative products etc.) and set up regulations on new services such as securitisations. There is also a need to restructure the banking system where some small banks are not really efficient in the market. Hence, merger and acquisitions may be a popular trend in the coming years. We believe that the SBV needs to have policies for restructuring the system and promoting competition in the banking sector of Vietnam.
Another policy implication concerns the relationship between loan and bank revenue and interest income from 2004 to 2009. We argued that tightening monetary policies starting in 2008 still have a big impact on the banking system in terms of compulsory reserves, loans and deposits. In parallel with the speed of the country's economic development, the loan growth rate grew dramatically. As the loan growth rate is higher than the deposit growth rate, commercial banks have to use sources such as the inter-bank market to meet borrowing demands. The misuse of this capital resource causes a serious imbalance in the capital structure and implicates high liquidity risk in the banking system. Moreover, when the inflation rate and deficit in trade balance have become more serious, the government used traditional tightening of monetary policy in order to reduce money supply circulation -the main reason for high inflation. Generally, the banking system encounters many difficulties, resulting from loss of balance in the source and use of funds, and the rapid increase in credit growth. This is also supported by our empirical results when customer loans increase, revenue and interest income generally decrease from 2004 to 2009. Thus, the SBV needs to balance the high demand of loans from the public and macroeconomic policies of the government.
Our results for Vietnam contrast with those for the USA and Europe found in previous work.
Our results support neither the SCP or EH models for Vietnam whereas the EH is favoured for the USA while the European banking system generally conforms to the SCP approach. Hence, our results add a further interesting contrast by geographical location on this issue. Sources: Koustedet al. (2005: 43) ; VCSC (2007: 5) and SBV (2009) . Table 1The Sources: Dufhues (2003: 32) ; SBV (2005 , 2009 ) and VCSC (2008 . See note to Table 3 . 
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